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Abstract: Some important elements of common property theory include a
focus on individual communities or user groups, local level adjudication of
conflicts, local autonomy in rule making, physical harvests, and low levels of
articulation with markets. We present a case study of multi-scale collective
action around indigenous/community conserved areas (ICCAs) in Oaxaca,
Mexico that suggests a modification of these components of common property
theory. A multi-community ICCA in Oaxaca demonstrates the importance of
inter-community collective action as key link in multi-scale governance, that
conflicts are often negotiated in multiple arenas, that rules emerge at multiple
scales, and that management for conservation and environmental services
implies no physical harvests. Realizing economic gains from ICCAs for strict
conservation may require something very different than traditional natural
resource management. It requires intense engagement with extensive networks
of government and civil society actors and new forms of community and intercommunity collection action, or multi-scale governance. Multi-scale governance
is built on trust and social capital at multiple scales and also constitutes collective
action at multiple scales. However, processes of multi-scale governance are also
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necessarily “turbulent” with actors frequently having conflicting values and goals
to be negotiated. We present an analytic history of the process of emergence of
community and inter-community collective action around strict conservation and
examples of internal and external turbulence. We argue that this case study and
other literature requires an extensions of the constitutive elements of common
property theory.
Keywords: Common property, indigenous/community conserved areas, multiscale governance, social capital, turbulence.
Acknowledgments: The USAID-TIES program provided funds for this
research. O. Molina received a scholarship from CONACYT and USAID TIES
for his master thesis and USAID-TIES supported his fieldwork. Geoconservacion
A.C. permitted a review of some technical reports. Thanks to community and
CORENCHI authorities who offered support during the last five years of fieldwork
and allowed us to be present in their assemblies. Permission to publish this article
was obtained from CORENCHI leadership with their free, prior and informed
consent.

1. Introduction
The central purpose of common property theory is to explain the evolution
of institutions for collective action (Ostrom 1990), but the focus has been
overwhelmingly on the critical enabling conditions for collective action by
individual local communities or user groups (Baland and Plateau 1996; Agrawal
2001). Other levels and scales are seen only as supporting in a “nested” fashion
the local scale, through “nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement,
governance” (Agrawal 2001). In this nested world, conflict is best mediated by
“availability of low cost adjudication” in “local arenas” (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal
2001, p. 1654). The role of locally devised rules as a part of this process is also
central, although this sits uneasily with the frequent reality of the “co-production”
of rules at the nested levels of enforcement and governance (Fox 1996; Ostrom
1996). Common property theory is also substantially based on the assumption
that user groups or communities are physically harvesting resources from the
environment, whether forests, fisheries, pastures or other productive sectors of
nature (Ostrom 1990, 2005; Agrawal 2001). A final central element of common
property theory important for this paper is that common property institutions
function best when there is “low levels of articulation with external markets”
(Agrawal 2001).
We have above singled several aspects of the many “critical enabling conditions”
(Agrawal 2001) or constitutive characteristics of success on the commons: the
locus of collective action, the role of higher “nested” scales, the resolution of
conflicts, locally devised rules, physical harvests, and the role of markets. We
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do so because we here present a case study of common property management
that we argue represents a heuristic, outlier case (George and Bennett 2005) that
has characteristics and outcomes not anticipated by traditional theory. We present
a case study of multi-scale collective action around indigenous/community
conserved areas in Oaxaca, Mexico. We present data and analyze the emergence
of collective action at the community, inter-community and higher governance
scales and levels (Termeer et al. 2010) and what we call “turbulence” in the
case of the Natural Resource Committee of the Upper Chinantla (CORENCHI),
a six-community organization in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico (Martin
et al. 2010)1. This case study is an example of collective action at multiple scales,
community and inter-community organizational processes that have established
contiguous indigenous/community conserved areas (Borrini-Feyerabend et al.
2004) based on the absence of harvesting and strict conservation on 77% of
their 34,908 ha of territory. This process has required integrating rules from
multiple scales and extensive negotiations of conflicts in multiple arenas to access
government programs and markets for environmental services (Molina-González
2011).
Our case study begins by analyzing collective action at the level of a
community, an accustomed focus of attention. Community governance supplies
the foundations of trust that permit multi-scale collective action to happen,
although communities may be highly turbulent in their decision-making. However,
communities may also have “a structure of social interaction characterized by
high entry and exit costs and non-anonymous relationships among members” and
“multilateral enforcement of group norms” and other elements that can predispose
to cooperation and lower the costs of collective action and overcome free-rider
problems by direct monitoring and sanctioning (Bowles and Gintis 1998, 2002,
p. 434). In Mexico, these possible tendencies are reinforced by the structure of
governance mandated by agrarian law, where assemblies of all rights holders are
required to meet at least twice a year, although well-functioning communities
commonly meet monthly, as in our case study.
We then go on to discuss the little analyzed process of inter-community
collective action. As Fox (1996) has noted for Mexico, dense social capital at the
community level can be highly segmented spatially. Neighboring communities
in many places in the world frequently have histories of conflict and tension over
territories and resources. The emergence of inter-community collective action
is not the norm since it must “overcome the socially constructed constraints
of locally confined solidarities” (Fox 1996, p. 1091). However, despite a few
examples (Antinori and Garcia-Lopez 2008; Paudel et al. 2010), inter-community
collective action has been little considered in the literature. We then examine
the emergence of inter-community or second level community organizations

1
In 2010 a seventh community joined CORENCHI, but we confine our analysis here to the six
communities that founded the organization.
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as a key element in strong networks of multi-scale governance (Berkes 2007;
Cronkleton et al. 2011; Duran et al. 2011). Multi-scale governance is more
often invoked than developed as a concept, but we suggest that multi-scale
governance be used to incorporate community collective action, the key link
of inter-community collective action, and then larger structures of “supportive
external sanctioning institutions”, “appropriate levels of external aid” and “nested
levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance” (Agrawal 2001,
p. 1654), by government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bilaterial
and multilateral agencies. This conception assumes the minimalist governance
criteria that central governments should not undermine local authority but also
include the other levels and scales which are constitutive of management of the
commons in the modern cross-scale world (Berkes 2007). This conception of
multi-scale governance also includes the coproduction of rules by multiple actors
at multiple scales (Fox 1996; Ostrom 1996), including government-provided
spaces to develop local rule autonomy, but within a framework where many
important management rules originate in formal national and international laws
and programs.
Using the concept of multi-scale governance to incorporate all of the
mentioned elements can also serve to step away from the use of the concept of
“nested” with its unfortunate connotations of domestic harmony in governance.
We propose the term “turbulence” as a characterization of the linked process
of support, appropriation, provision, enforcement and governance where actors
frequently have conflicting values and goals to be negotiated (Carley and
Christie 1992; Means and Josayma 2002; Alcorn et al. 2003). The multiple scale
processes of constructing governance are characterized by actors performing
in “uncoordinated and dissonant ways in attempting to meet their individual
objectives, typically externalizing as many of the costs and internalizing as
many of the benefits of their actions as they can” (Carley and Christie 1992,
p. 156). The notion of turbulence is related to the idea of power conflict in
cross-scale networks (Adger et al. 2005) but is more general, and in our case
territorial ownership and some degree of rule-making autonomy within multiscale governance, as we shall see below, mitigates power differentials. Multiscale governance is collective and turbulent action that requires both the prior
existence and strengthening of trust and social capital at multiple levels and
scales from local to international (Adger 2003; Andersson et al. 2005; Termeer
et al. 2010; Duran et al. 2011). This conception of turbulent multi-scale governance
goes beyond “low cost adjudication” in conflict resolution and embraces the idea
that conflict resolution is a process of on-going negotiations between actors in
multiple arenas rather than discrete conflicts to be adjudicated. This also assumes
increasing confidence on the part of community and inter-community actors to
negotiate with and challenge other levels of governance (Alcorn et al. 2003).
It presumes community-based management, less of natural resources, than of
extensive networks of government and civil society actors and new forms of
community and inter-community collective action.
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Our case study also requires extensions of common property theory to include
collective action around common properties for strict conservation. Ostrom’s
(2009) framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological resource
systems focuses on “users” and “harvests” and “products”. The implications of
common property management focused on strict conservation are not considered.
Conservation with little or no extraction does not produce physical harvests,
and markets for it are usually framed as “environmental services” to be paid by
users in a market or by government beyond the territorial boundaries (Muradian
et al. 2010). Realizing income from these sources requires deep involvement in
multi-scale governance for the owners of the conserved resource to realize any
monetary benefit from the “products”. Realizing economic gains from ICCAs for
strict conservation may require something very different than traditional natural
resource management, and may require a high level of articulation with that most
challenging of contemporary markets, environmental services. Sacred groves in
India are a traditional expression of commons conservation, but are characterized
as threatened precisely because they generate few economic benefits and are not
recognized at multiple levels (Chandrakanth et al. 2004).
Our task is to define the constitutive elements (Goertz 2005) of the expansion
of common property theory and to tentatively identify the variables which appear
to have led to this outcome unanticipated in the literature. It is an example of both
community and inter-community collective action around strict conservation,
where “harvesting” of any kind is explicitly disallowed, where the realization of
economic gains from “conservation” as an ecosystem service can only be realized
by increasing sophistication in negotiations with multiple actors.
Our case study also highlights the emerging importance of ICCAs (Berkes
2009; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010; Brown and Kothari 2011; Martin et al.
2011) as a common property management option. The IUCN has defined them as
“natural and modified ecosystems, including significant biodiversity, ecological
services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous peoples and
local and mobile communities through customary laws or other effective means”
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004, p. xv). Mexico has been a world leader in the
formal recognition of ICCAs, building on its achievements in community forest
management for timber production (Bray et al. 2006). Mexico adopted in 2008
a new national protected area category called “voluntary conservation areas”
(including private reserves) and recognizes them as part of the national protected
areas system (Martin et al. 2010). Mexico’s Natural Protected Areas Commission
(CONANP) has currently certified 85 communities in a total of 212,580 ha. Of
these, 46 certifications (54% of the total) and 108,763 ha (51%) are certified on
community lands in the state of Oaxaca2. The occurrence of so many ICCAs in
Oaxaca is not an accident. Oaxaca is heavily indigenous and historically has
had land management practices which tend towards conservation of forest and

2

http://www.conanp.gob.mx/que_hacemos/listado_areas.php; accessed 8/2/11.

156

David Bray et al.

other vegetation cover (Boege 2008). In recent decades, in the Sierra Norte
and elsewhere in Oaxaca, a variety of traditional and contemporary community
management practices have conserved forests while generating income for local
communities (Robson 2007). Oaxaca is also the most biodiverse state in Mexico,
but with only 5.2% of its territory under federal protection (García-Mendoza
et al. 2004; Martínez-Hernández 2010), and the emergence of ICCAs only
provides formal recognition that traditional community practices have conserved
forest cover and biodiversity in this area.

2. Methods
2.1. Context and study site
Our study is focused on a group of six Chinantec indigenous communities with
membership in an inter-community organization called the Natural Resources
Committee of the Upper Chinantla (Comité de Recursos Naturales de la
Chinantla Alta-CORENCHI), legally established in 2005 with six communities:
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla (Santa Cruz), San Antonio el Barrio (el Barrio), San
Pedro Tlatepusco (San Pedro), Santiago Tlatepusco (Santiago), San Antonio
Analco (Analco) and Nopalera Rosario (Nopalera) (Figure 1). Community
lands are contiguous and located in the Upper Chinantla subregion of the Sierra
Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico (Figure 1) which form part of the Papaloapan River
watershed. The total area is 34,907 ha with 26,770 ha certified as a Indigenous/
Community Conserved Areas by the National Commission of Natural Protected
Areas (CONANP) by 2011 (Table 1), the largest single block of certified ICCAs
in Mexico.
The region has large masses of intact contiguous forests along an elevation
gradient from around 200 to over 3000 meters above sea level and includes
perennial tropical forest, broadleaf montane rainforest, evergreen cloud forest,
and pine-oak-liquidambar forest. Due to biogeographic processes, the complex
topography, and climate, the community forests present wide diversity in types,
transition zones, and tree communities with high species richness and structural
complexity, particularly of patches of Liquidambar, Engelhardtia, Cirilla,
and great diversity in the families of Lauracea and Rubiaceae (Rzedowski and
Palacios 1977; Meave et al. 2006), and are widely considered to be of very high
conservation value. Floristic checklists report around 3000 species of vascular
plants with neotropical origins, which is around 12% of the total of flora Mexicana
(Meave et al. unpublished). Recently, the landscape has been shown to support
jaguars (Panthera onca) and other felines (Figel et al. 2011). The region is
considering a hot spot of biodiversity (CONABIO 2007). In the zoned agricultural
areas there are areas of rotating corn agriculture and coffee plantations that harbor
multiple genetic diversity of crops like maize, chili, wild greens, domestic and
semi-domestic avocado varieties, and secondary succession trees, among many
others (Bost 2009; Hite 2011).
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Figure 1: Chinantla study site where six communities analyzed are located the dotted line refers
to different municipalities.

Table 1: CORENCHI community territories, ICCA area and PHS areas
Community

Territory3

ICCA area (ha)4/date5

Payment for hydrological services6/date7

Nopalera del Rosario
San Antonio Analco
San Antonio del Barrio
San Pedro Tlatepusco
Santiago Tlatepusco
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla
Total

5,329.55
2,677.14
2,310.82
6,289.68
5,945.60
12,372.80
34,907.99

4200/2009
2050/2011
1500/2004
5050/2004
4300/2004
9670/2004
26,770.00

2,299.00/2007
1,473.71/2007
1,150.98/2004; 400.10/2007*
2,534.13/2004; 1,443.542/2007*
1,969.05/2004; 852.63/2007*
2,534.67/2004; 1,398.139/2007*
16,056.96

*Additional area for PH.

3
4
5
6
7

Source: Official Community Rules (Estatutos);
Source: Ortega del Valle et al. 2010
Dates when documents were made official
Source: Geoconservación A.C.;
Dates when documents were made official
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The population density is low, with high percentages of young people, but
also heavily impacted by emigration, which has reduced populations and relieved
pressure on land. Education levels are low, an average of 4.6 years (INEGI 2005).
Most men are subsistence corn farmers with income historically coming primarily
from coffee cultivation. In recent years, various government support programs and
remittances have replaced coffee as the principal source of cash income (Nieratka
2011). Community governance is a blend of traditional practices and structures
mandated by Mexican agrarian law (Bray et al. 2006). The main decision-making
body is the General Assembly, and the executor of Assembly decisions is the
Comisariado (composed of a president, secretary and treasurer) and an Oversight
Council (composed of a president and two secretaries) who carry out the decisions
of the Assembly (Figure 2). The Comisariado and the Oversight Council are
elected democratically for three-year terms, although the Assembly can reduce
the period for non-performance. Crucially, it is the Assembly that establishes rules
for land use and governs access and use of the forest common property, although
constrained by agrarian and forest law. Government agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies also are important players and
we classify them as “local” (normally state-level), “national” (usually with offices
in Mexico City), and international (main offices abroad; including bilaterial and
multilateral agencies).
The case study was found opportunistically (George and Bennett 2005) with
the authors identifying it as an unusual case of collective inter-community action
around conservation. We visited the communities several times per year, held
informal interviews with external stakeholders and community leaders, including
current and past leaders of CORENCHI, and five annual graduate field courses
(2006–2011). We also attended at least three CORENCHI assemblies annually
from 2008 to 2011 and participated in various community Assembly meetings. We
also had access to an extensive gray literature produced by NGOs, government
agencies, and conducted 36 semi structured interviews during 2010–2011 with
CORENCHI community leaders and additional ones with key external actors,
which are more extensively analyzed in Molina-González (2011).

CORENCHI
Delegates

General assembly

Comisariado de bienes
Comunales
President
Secretary
Treasurer

Oversight council
President
First secretary
Second secretary

Figure 2: Assembly’s basic governance structure mandated by Mexican Agrarian Law.
CORENCHI Delegates added in 2008.
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3. Results
Our results will consist of (1) an analytic narrative of the emergence of collective
action at the community level, inter-community and other levels divided into two
periods, 1980–2000 (with some reference to earlier periods) and 2000–2010, and
(2) brief analytic narratives of two case studies of turbulence and negotiation of
conflicts in multi-scale governance. The first is an example of turbulence internal
to the organization at the inter-community scale and the second turbulence
between the organization and external stakeholders.
3.1. Period I: 1980–2000
Before the 1980s, the CORENCHI communities were remote, roadless, and
had limited interaction with the Mexican nation (De Teresa 2011). In the 1930s,
Chinantec communities were so mistrustful that the inhabitants fled to the forest
when outsiders came into the community (Bevan 1938). Many of the communities
had a history of authoritarian leaders and conflicts with neighbors, with deadly
boundary disputes between villages. Informal land use rules existed around corn
and coffee lands, but few rules existed on natural resource extraction, because
soil and forest resources were abundant and there was a relatively low population.
In the 1970s, the first sustained government program in the region other than in
public education came from the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE) which
expanded coffee as a cash crop in the community and helped to build trust in
outside institutions (Figure 3; Hite 2011). In the early 1980s, another government
program, the Rural Food Supply Network (DICONSA), sent an organizer into the
communities of the region to establish non-profit communal stores to mitigate
erratic and expensive food supplies (Fox 2007). The DICONSA community
organizer also established relationships of trust and in the mid-1980s supported
members of the communities of Santa Cruz Tepetotutla and Santiago Tlatepusco
to establish community development cooperatives that would later become
specialized in coffee marketing (Mutersbaugh 2002). In 1990, the disappearance
of INMECAFE because of neoliberal reforms and the collapse of the International
Coffee Agreement led to a dramatic fall and instability in coffee prices for the last
two decades (Bray et al. 2002). This led to: 1) efforts to expand coffee marketing
cooperatives at the local and state level with the emergence of a state-wide
coordination of coffee producers named as Local NGO-1 (Figure 3) in the 1990s
and the development of organic coffee as a higher-value alternative; and 2) a rapid
increase in emigration from the communities in search of cash income to replace
coffee.
In the 1990s, the first NGOs arrived in the communities. In the early 1990s,
National NGO (NNGO-2), a research-action NGO affiliated with the National
Autonomous University of Mexico began carrying out research in the communities
of Santa Cruz and Santiago. Later in the 1990s, Local (LNGO-3), supported in
part by the US government agency the Inter-American Foundation, began to
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Private
sector

NGOs and
confederations

Universities
International

Inter-American foundation
INMECAFE
(1970-1989)

UNAM
National

DICONSA
(1981-PRESENT)

SEMARNAT

State

LNGO-3

NNGO-2

STT

SAA

SCT

Coffee
cooperatives

Floristic
study
Offer grants to communities

Grants go to communities through NGOs

Local

SPT

Regional

LNGO-1

Level

Bilateral and Mexican
government agencies

Governance by community assemblies

Figure 3: Early Period of Multi-scale Governance in Communities 1980–2000 (INMECAFE=
Mexican Coffee Institute; UNAM=National Autonomous University of Mexico; LNGO=Local
or State NGO; NNGO=National NGO).

provide training workshops and funds for small projects in domestic industries in
several of the communities. The community development cooperative established
with support from the DICONSA organizer, composed of only a small percentage
of the community, had been seen as a threat by both internal and external political
forces in the region and was under constant hostility. However, “In spite of social
pressure, the cooperative managed to consolidate itself as a minority organization
within the village” (van der Wal 1999, p. 3).
As the 1990s progressed, the cooperative also began to more aggressively
promote a position of strong communal cooperation in the Assembly while
small-scale cattle ranchers pushed for privatization of agricultural lands, with
most community members not choosing sides (Mutersbaugh 2002). Also in the
1990s, LNGO-3 advisors took community leaders for meetings with high state
government officials about community needs, particularly on the construction of
a road into Santa Cruz, giving them new confidence in dealing with government
(CAMPO 2005). From 1993 to 1996 botanical researchers from the Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) carried out fieldwork in Santa Cruz and
hired local guides, some of whom began to gain an understanding of the scientific
and ecological value of community forests. These guides would later emerge as
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some of the most forceful early leaders of the CORENCHI organizational process.
Thus, by 2000 community leaders had gained new confidence in dealing with
outsiders, had begun to see some external benefits flowing, and began to gain a
new appreciation of the conservation value of their forests, and that conservation
might be used to generate income to reduce emigration. However, continued deep
mistrust in the Assembly was also a recurring theme in interactions with outsiders.
It should also be noted that the evolution of collective action at the community
level was in a sub-coalition of community members in the production cooperative,
with community efforts focused on road building and bringing in electricity, but
none of these had a conservation focus. Figure 3 indicates that external actors who
helped influence community governance began to appear, but at a much lower
density than would occur in the subsequent decade.
3.2. Period 2: 2000–2010
Beginning around 2000, growing international concern over degradation and
deforestation brought new national and international attention to the large intact
forests of the Chinantla, and resulted in a rapid expansion in the number of external
actors interested in the region, and a corresponding much greater density of the
support networks in multi-scale governance (Figure 4). We will continue to focus
on processes in Santa Cruz as the first leader of CORENCHI.
By the late 1990s, earlier informal community rules for forest conservation
(such as leaving large stands of Pinus chiapensis standing in the agricultural areas)
were joined by a new sensitivity to environmental management brought by organic
coffee production (Molina-González 2011). In 1999 they proposed a project for
sustainable logging in the forests, as was practiced in many other communities in
Sierra Norte (Bray 1991). A government program suggested that before logging
it would be useful to carry out a land use planning exercise called a Community
Territory Land – Use Zoning (Ordenamiento Territorial Comunitario – OTC) (Anta
et al. 2006). Thus, in 2000 a Mexican government-World Bank program called
the Program for Conservation and Forest Management (PROCYMAF) funded a
Oaxaca NGO (LNGO-4) to carry out the OTC for Santa Cruz. In the following
year the same NGO produced a logging management plan. This was halted after
one year both because of government concerns about logging the environmentally
protected Pinus chiapensis and the fact that a community leader absconded with
funds, causing the community to lose interest in physical harvests from the forest.
In the meantime, the simmering dispute in the community between the proponents
of community collective action and the cattle-raising privatizing faction continued,
and in 2003, for the first time, the community elected a slate of leaders who were
strongly identified with the communal faction and who had become imbued with a
sense of the ecological importance of their common property forests through their
work with the UNAM ecological researchers.
With the support of LNGO-4, the new leadership took the OTC and began
to try and develop community statutes, local rules required by national agrarian
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CONANP
“JOINT
FUNDS”

OAXACA STATE
GOVERNMENT

National polytechnic
institute

NNGO-7

LNGO-6

UNIVERSIDAD
VERACRUZANA

LNGO-9
LNGO-4

LNGO-3

CIIDIR-OAXACA

LNGO-1

Regional

COINBIO
PROGRAM
PROCYMAF
PROGRAM

CORENCHI

Infrastructure
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CONAFOR

National

CDI

Governance by Community Assemblies: SCT-Santa Cruz Tepetotutla, SPT-San
Pedro Tlatepuzco, SAB-San Antonio el Barrio, ST-Santiago Tlatepuzco, SAA-San
Antonio Analco, NR-Nopalera Rosario

Figure 4: Multi-scale Governance in Communities during period 2000–2010 (UNDP-GEF=
United Nations Development Program-Global Environmental Facility; MIE=Integral Ecosystem
Management; CDI=National Commission for Indigenous Development; CONAFOR=National
Forestry Commission; SNGO=Small International NGO; INGO=International NGO; NNGO=
National NGO; LNGO=Local or State NGO).

legislation, as a foundation for more systematic land use planning, beginning the
period where community assemblies were largely focused for the first time on the
common property forest. In 2002, multilateral interest in the Chinantla manifested
itself when the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funded the Mexico office
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to carry out projects in
natural resource management in three regions of Mexico, including the Chinantla,
through a program called Integrated Ecosystem Management (Manejo Integral
de Ecosistemas-MIE) (2001–2009). MIE issued a call for proposals to NGOs
for work in the region, and the newly formed Local NGO-6, won the proposal
to start work in three communities, Santa Cruz, el Barrio, and Santiago. During
this period, the more development-oriented LNGO-4 began to reduce its presence
in the community, and the more conservation-oriented LNGO-6, with funding
from MIE, began to assume a more prominent role as a community advisor. The
new community leadership was strengthened in its belief in the inherent value
of conservation and its perception that conservation could produce income to
counteract emigration due to continued instability in coffee prices. They had come
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to believe in the conservation value of their forests and made the bet that ecological
value could be translated to market value. Santa Cruz was thus very open to
working with LNGO-6, and continued formalizing the OTC through community
statutes, with support from PROCYMAF. Thus, government financing of an NGO
supported the communities in devising local rules within a framework of national
agrarian law. Because the small-scale cattle ranching interests remained strong,
there were stormy discussions in community assembly meetings for two years
over zoning of pasture lands and rights to hunt (with the communal group arguing
that wildlife was in decline due to overhunting), areas in which communities had
local rule-making autonomy. Santa Cruz finally adopted statutes in June, 2003
that called for restrictions on all harvesting from what it now defined as a 9670
ha ICCA (78.2% of its total territory of 12,372.8 ha; see Table 1). The statutes
prohibited agriculture and hunting and called for a strict protectionist policy of
“no extraction of plants, animals, fruits, seeds … timber and firewood” in the
conservation area and required all community members to establish firebreaks
around their corn fields, among other environmental measures. In the same period,
and contrary to the welcoming reception in Santa Cruz, LNGO-6 found deep
suspicion in el Barrio, as well as continued tensions over boundaries between
Santa Cruz and el Barrio. LNGO-6 proposed to Santa Cruz leaders that el Barrio
leaders be invited to one of the workshops to discuss the OTC and the statutes,
and Santa Cruz reluctantly agreed. The leaders of el Barrio were impressed by the
discussion and requested an OTC and statutes for their community, which was
also carried out with funding from PROCYMAF.
As Santa Cruz began to mature in its proposals, two new federal government
programs opened up new opportunities. First, Mexico’s National Protected Areas
Commission (CONANP) established a new program of certification of ICCAs.
Also in 2004, Mexico’s National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) launched
a new payment for hydrological services program (PHS) (Muñoz-Piña et al.
2008; Nieratka 2011) which would make cash payments for conserving forests in
watersheds. Despite deep concerns from some community members afraid that the
program would imply losing control over their community lands, Santa Cruz, el
Barrio, Santiago, San Pedro agreed to both programs. LNGO-6 had initially met
with resistance and mistrust from the other communities in early meetings. But
when leaders from Santa Cruz began accompanying them, relations and acceptance
improved, and historical inter-community tensions were reduced. Subsequently, in
2003 LNGO-6 used the same methodology of carrying out an OTC and developing
community statutes in the communities of San Pedro and Santiago.
In the case of Santa Cruz, the conservation strategy had emerged from nearly
two decades of struggle over the direction of community leadership, but first el
Barrio and then the other two communities, after the initial mistrust, were rapidly
convinced by Santa Cruz leaders and the promise of material benefits. By 2004
the other three communities had carried out OTCs and had adopted very similar
statutes to those in Santa Cruz that required strict conservation in their newly
defined ICCAs. In late 2004, as a result of both community leadership and the
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work of LNGO6, the first four communities signed a “Regional Community
Agreement for the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the Perfume and
Santiago River Watersheds”, signaling a new era of trust, social capital, and multiterritorial governance between the neighboring communities and new interactions
with NGO and government actors at higher scales. The agreement committed
the four communities in the two neighboring watersheds to a community-based
regional management plan with the same strict restrictions against extraction that
were first contained in the community statutes elaborated in Santa Cruz. These
community-imposed restrictions went beyond anything required in the ICCAs
or the PHS program, neither one of which prohibited hunting, for example.
The ecological discourse, and clearly deep belief, on the part of some of the
CORENCHI leadership is exemplified by the following quote, where they fashion
a discourse of conservation continuity with traditional practices, “Our ancestors
left as a legacy the value of community conservation. In our community the labor
of natural resource conservation transcends the generations. The forest for us is the
“cradle of the jaguar’, where bird songs are born and every kind of wildlife exists.
So taking care of the pheasant’s habitat, the red brocket deer, jaguar, armadillo,
woodcocks, is to take care of our territory” (CONAFOR 2010).
In 2005, the two neighboring communities of Analco and Nopalera, who had
also initially shown great mistrust of external actors when first approached about
the effort, but were won over by persistence efforts by a Santa Cruz leader, signed
the agreement and formed CORENCHI, making it a six community organization
with a total 34,907 ha, of which 26,770 ha are under strict community protection
(Ortega del Valle et al. 2010), and as of 2011 all six certified as ICCAs by
CONANP. The objectives of the organization included the “strengthening of the
communities to conserve and rationally use their natural resources for the benefit
of its families through seeking financing” and establishing agreements with
government agencies and international organizations, clearly signaling the goal
of obtaining funding through interactions and negotiations with external actors
at multiple levels. The most important immediate result came from the Mexican
government’s PHS program. By 2007, a total of 16,056 ha were receiving payment
under the PHS (Table 1). The PHS program has resulted in substantial flows of
financial resources into the CORENCHI communities and CORENCHI founding
leaders saw these payments as validating their strategy of conservation as a way
to “harvest” financial resources for their conservation initiatives. For example,
the communities of Santa Cruz and San Pedro received some US$570,000 dollars
apiece during the 2004–2010 period and, although not large on a per capita basis,
these payments have had a significant poverty alleviation effect (Nieratka 2011).
The program gives contracts for five year periods and it has now been renewed
once, but there are uncertainties about its future to be discussed further below. In
addition to the PHS program, the CORENCHI communities have received myriad
smaller income generation, food production, and ecotourism project support from
the national indigenous agency and a state government biodiversity program
called COINBIO (Figure 4).
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As the organizational and ecosystem management accomplishments of
CORENCHI became known, other actors entered the picture. CONANP recruited
the philanthropic arm of Mexico’s largest brewery, whose plant on the Papaloapan
River drew water from this watershed, to do work in the community. The brewery
foundation (Fundación Modelo) supported a National NGO (NNGO-7) to develop
ecotourism in Santa Cruz, financing the building of a cabin and equipment and
training for guides. In 2007, a small international NGO (SINGO-8) also began
working in the region on participatory video, community research, training on
ICCA management, and some advocacy issues. Researchers were also attracted
and field courses and student research were carried out from US and Mexican
universities (Figel et al. 2011; Hite 2011; Molina-González 2011; Nieratka 2011;
Velasco 2011), among others. Figure 4 shows the very high-density of multi-scale
support which emerged to help CORENCHI govern its land use at the community
and regional level. However, the coming together in collective action and multiscale governance of multiple actors in government and civil society has not been so
much “nested” as turbulent with frequent conflicts and negotiations. CORENCHI
leadership has had to become increasingly sophisticated at negotiating these
conflicts. Of many possible instances, we will now briefly review two cases of
turbulence, one which we will term internal, around establishing the rules for
leadership of CORENCHI and the second, external, around an effort by CONANP
to convince the communities to agree to the declaration of a Biosphere Reserve in
addition to the ICCAs.
3.3. Internal turbulence: establishing and maintaining rules of leadership
for CORENCHI
CORENCHI’s founding statutes established that the leadership of CORENCHI
would be composed of the Presidents of the Comisariado of each community,
modeling other inter-community organizations in Mexico, but that they would
serve two year terms (instead of three). Thus, for the first year or so of its
existence CORENCHI was administered by the six Comisariado Presidents, who
had elected the leader of Santa Cruz with a long trajectory as a cooperative leader
and strong conservation beliefs, as its President. However, there emerged a timing
problem. The new CORENCHI leader was ending his period as the Comisariado
of Santa Cruz in 2007, but still had another year to go as CORENCHI President.
By the statutes, he could not continue as President of CORENCHI if he was not
President of the Comisariado. This leader was considered by LNGO-6 to be a key
person in the early success of CORENCHI, and it could be damaging to the young
organization that he leave. So it was proposed at a meeting in June, 2007 that the
statutes be revised to allow the soon-to-be former Comisariado to continue on
for one more year as CORENCHI President. However, opposition arose from
the small-scale cattle ranching interests among the Comisariados. This led to a
protracted period of discussion, negotiations, and tension within CORENCHI and
with their advisors over what the rules of leadership of the organization would
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be, an arena where they had autonomy in decision-making. After six months
of discussions and conflict resolution workshops convened by MIE, the UNDP
program, a proposal from MIE suggested that CORENCHI be composed of four
delegates from each community, elected by the community assembly (Figure 2),
and that the CORENCHI President be elected from those delegates, to side step the
problem of coordinating the service periods of the Comisariado Presidents. The
delegates would not hold any other office in their communities, and community
Presidents would participate with a voice but no vote. These new leadership rules
were incorporated into the statutes at a December, 2007 meeting where the new
President was a delegate from Santa Cruz who proved to be an able leader, and
that also decided to dedicate 5% of the funds received from PHS to CORENCHI
expenses, giving it an economic foundation. Thus, a multilateral organization and
a local NGO were key in supporting CORENCHI to develop new governance
rules to resolve the leadership crisis.
3.4. External turbulence: community conserved areas or biosphere reserve?
NGOs had long seen this part of Sierra Norte as a candidate for the declaration
of a Biosphere Reserve given its extensive intact blocks of cloud and montane
tropical forest (Bray 1991). CONANP along with LNGO-6 had initially promoted
the concept of ICCAs among the communities of CORENCHI and, as we have
seen, CORENCHI accepted the CONANP certification of their ICCAs beginning
in 2004 (Table 1). Nonetheless, as early as 2005 the Oaxaca office of CONANP
began proposing the idea of a Biosphere Reserve in the Chinantla, arguing
that it would receive greater resources and international prestige. By Mexican
environmental law, ICCAs are granted by a process of certification that is in
principal initiated by the communities and does not require a decree. A Biosphere
Reserve, on the other hand, can be proposed by the government and requires
a Presidential Decree, although community consultation is also legally required
(LGEEPA 1988). CORENCHI was initially interested in the idea, and even sent
a letter to the national Director of CONANP in 2005 expressing an interest in
the possibility of a Reserve decree. The process would develop over the next
four years and would become filled with tension and splits between government
agencies and CORENCHI’s supporting NGOs over the issue of a decree. In the
first years, the CORENCHI leadership was generally convinced that it would bring
greater benefits to their communities, but as the proposal developed and came
closer to reality splits among the external actors over the wisdom of accepting a
decree drove the community assemblies to become more concerned that a Reserve
would cause them to lose control or possession of their lands. CONANP sent a
local consulting NGO (LNGO-9) into the CORENCHI communities to try and
convince them of the advantages of a Biosphere Reserve in a series of meetings in
late 2008 and early 2009. MIE, which had initially opposed the decree, eventually
sided with CONANP in promoting it.
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However, during the same period, the CORENCHI leadership approached
the small international NGO (SINGO-8) that had begun working in the region in
2007 and asked for some legal advice. SINGO-8 hired a lawyer who met with the
Santa Cruz community assembly to discuss the legal implications of a Reserve,
after that SINGO-8 and LNGO-6 discussed the issue in the other communities.
SINGO-8 adopted a strong advocacy position against the decree. LNGO-6, which
had been the principal advisor and supported by CONANP, entered into a crisis
in its relationship with CONANP over its more moderate opposition to the decree
and other issues. Some CORENCHI leaders were also taken to visit the Reserves
in the states of Veracruz and Chiapas. From these visits they took away that the
figure of the “Director” in a Biosphere Reserve would have had too much control
over their rights to resources on their land. This was a confused and turbulent period
with pressure from CONANP to accept a Biosphere Reserve, the CORENCHI
leadership torn between CONANP and the fears of the community assemblies,
and confused and tense relations between NGOs and NGOs and government
agencies. Things came to a head at the 9th World Wilderness Congress in Mérida,
Yucatan in November, 2009, when CORENCHI leaders announced publicly the
sense of the assemblies that they did not want a Reserve decree. A month later, at
a CORENCHI meeting in one of the communities, officials who had pushed the
Reserve concept publically apologized to CORENCHI. The CORENCHI decision
has been respected and there has been no further talk of a Biosphere Reserve for
the region.

4. Discussion
We suggested in our introduction that CORENCHI presented an outlier case study
within the literature on common property natural resource management. It is a case
where communities managing their common property engaged first in turbulent
collective action at the community level, and second in turbulent collective action
at the inter-community level that overcame long-standing mistrust, to maximize
benefits from a strategy of not harvesting from their forest common properties.
They eventually placed their territories under a regional community coordinated
management plan, and sought income from conservation through intensive
articulation with extensive network of external actors at multiple scales, where
relationships were also turbulent (Figure 4). This strategy derived both from the
internalization of ecological notions of ecosystem value on the part of some leaders
and the fact that the communities were losing population due to the instability
of coffee prices beginning in the late 1980s. Conservation was perceived by
some community leaders as a strategy to replace lost coffee income, but one that
required a high level of articulation with external sources of funding. Emigration
was perceived as a threat to community life, but it also reduced pressure on
agricultural lands, lowering the opportunity costs for conservation. In response to
the opportunities for conservation and its possible economic benefits, the external
actors around the CORENCHI communities have come together in a frequently
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conflictive and turbulent process to help the communities achieve the goals of
both conservation and higher incomes. Conflicts were resolved in both local
and national arenas, such as an international conservation congress, not through
“adjudication” but through intense discussions and negotiations in contexts of
constant turbulence. It is a measure of the resilience of the communities that the
process has continued moving forward despite all of the turbulence (Folke 2006;
Magis 2010).
The rules which are governing this process have been produced both by
government agencies and by the communities. The basic governing institutions at
the community level are mandated by agrarian law, including the requirement that
they have community statutes, but are also informed by much older community
traditions. The rules governing ICCAs and the PHS program come from above
and the communities have had to adapt to their requirements, with some confusion
and turbulence over exactly what the requirements are. The communities however,
had the space to write community statutes which responded to the majority
interests at the time and have had to evolve and adjust rules around leadership of
CORENCHI, with no guidance in the laws as to how to structure the leadership,
but with support from a multilateral organization and a local NGO, a case of the
co-production of governance (Ostrom 1996). One of the significant consequences
of this inter-community collective actions was to improve the “fit” between the
ecosystems and the management structure, placing the forest territories of the
six contiguous communities under similar management rules, creating a form of
regional common property (Folke et al. 2007).
The process remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. The PSA program
is undergoing a policy transition to try and create markets for hydrological
services rather than direct government payment, and is now focusing on the
mechanism of “Joint Funds” (Fondos Concurrentes). Previously, funds came
from a tax on water users nationally as well as World Bank and Mexican
government sources (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008) but funding at those levels is
not likely to continue. In the Fondos Concurrentes approach the government
contributes 50% to a fund for a given region and downstream users or other
interested stakeholders contribute 50% (Nieratka 2011). In 2010 CORENCHI
communities received their first payment through this mechanism but it is not
yet clear if it will allow for payments to continue at the same levels they have
until now. There are also uncertainties around the policies surrounding the
ICCA program. A May, 2008 amendment to the environmental law (LGEEPA)
provided legal support to the ICCAs and incorporated them formally into the
national protected areas system, but the regulatory framework has not been
established as of early 2012.
As well, minorities in a few of the CORENCHI communities remain opposed
to the strict conservation policies that came from both the government programs
and community statutes, and continue to agitate in the assemblies for the nowdenied right to place corn fields in fertile soils in the PHS area and to carry out
subsistence hunting in the ICCA. Tensions over these issues have been raised by
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the fact that SINGO-8 has taken a strong advocacy position for this minority in
public settings. As well, recent research in one of the CORENCHI communities has
suggested that the cumulative impact of the rules on corn field location and hunting
associated with the PHS and ICCA  programs have reduced food sovereignty
and could lead to a decline in traditional knowledge of hunting and the territory
(Ibarra et al. 2011). However, the community has the right to abrogate the PHS
contract and change the community restrictions on hunting, so these tendencies are
reversible, if the community chooses. There has already been one case in Mexico
where a community has asked for its ICCA to be revoked because of opposition
by a minority of community members over rights to locate agricultural fields in
the area (Schmidt 2010), and this possibility cannot be ruled out in some of the
CORENCHI communities. For now, the majority of the community assemblies
appear to support the strict conservation programs, whatever its trade-offs. Figel
et al. (2011) carried out 156 interviews in four CORENCHI communities and
found that 93% of respondents support the conservation initiatives. Nieratka (2011)
found in a survey of two of the CORENCHI communities that 72% of a sample
felt that payments from the PHS program were worth the restrictions placed on
forest use. It is clearly the PHS program that has provided the most significant
economic incentive for the six communities to undertake and maintain collective
action around strict conservation (Nieratka 2011). However, this variable alone
does not explain the emergence of inter-community collective action. Since 2004,
the PHS program has made payments to over 5400 communities and private
land owners in Mexico (CONAFOR 2010), and CORENCHI appears to be the
most mature and geographically extensive case of community collective action
connected to the program.
We do not know why inter-community collective action stimulated by the
PHS program apparently did not emerge elsewhere in Mexico. Here we can only
propose some tentative independent variables that had consequences for land
use and the community pursuit of a conservation and multi-scale governance
strategy in the CORENCHI case. These include (1) the collapse and subsequent
instability of coffee prices that caused emigration, (2) the role of emigration
in reducing land use pressure and lowering opportunity costs for conservation,
(3) the emergence of visionary, ecologically informed leadership that became
convinced of the environmental value of their forests beyond any immediate
utilitarian value, but who were also focused on articulating with new sources
of funding from conservation, and (4) the arrival of national and international
programs that emphasized and provided varying economic incentives for
conservation, primarily from the PHS, but also from various other smaller
sources of support. The process that emerged from the interaction of these
variables built upon the social capital at the community level, increasing trust
between leaders, and leaders who could communicate that trust to the more
mistrustful assemblies, and outside actors. In an evaluation of experiences
in collective action (or “self-organization”) of communities that had won
the Equator prize, Seixas and Davy (2008) argue that the six key elements
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to success were: (1) involvement and commitment of key players (including
communities), (2) funding, (3) strong leadership, (4) capacity building, (5)
partnership with supportive organizations and government, and (6) economic
incentives (including alternative livelihood options) and that initiatives
“opportunistically evolve in a multi-level world, in which local communities
establish linkages with people and organizations at different political levels,
across different geographic scales and for different purposes” (Seixas and Davy
2008). These elements track the independent variables and the dynamics of the
CORENCHI experience, although the outcomes of inter-community collective
action for strict conservation, and the centrality of capacity to negotiate at
multiple levels in turbulent settings, are not analyzed in the Seixas and Davy
(2008) sample.

5. Conclusions
In our conclusions we will move beyond the particulars of our heuristic, outlier
case study (George and Bennett 2005) and use it to propose an extension of some
of the constitutive elements (Goertz 2005) of concepts of common property
management and success on the commons, and some of the possible outcomes
that can characterize it. This proposed extension incorporates not only the current
case study but similar strands of thinking and empirical research that emerge from
recent literature. These include the phenomenon of inter-community collective
action (Antinori and Garcia 2008; Paudel et al. 2010) and that the dynamic
multi-scale nature of contemporary commons management is not captured by the
concept of nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and governance
(Agrawal 2001). Contemporary commons management, when rights have been
defined or are in a process of definition, takes place in a context of turbulent multiscale governance where communities, governments, NGOs, and international
organizations must constantly negotiate the rules and resolve conflicts on the fly
over governance of harvests, territories, market access and government subsidies,
and monitoring and enforcement of co-produced rules at multiple levels (Alcorn
et al. 2003; Berkes 2007; Seixas and Davy 2008; Cronkleton et al. 2011).
Table 2 represents an effort to show how traditional common property
theory may be extended to take into account these empirical realities of
contemporary commons management. In the first column we find listed the
factors or core subsystems (Ostrom 2009; Agrawal 2001) which provide a first
level of the definition of the central elements of successful common property
management. In the second column, we present a summarized listing of the
secondary elements or “critical enabling conditions” synthesized by (Agrawal
2001). In the third column we present the new constitutive elements that we
proposed based on the CORENCHI case study and other recent literature cited
above, and in the final column new outcomes which can define success on the
commons.

Small Size, Clearly defined boundaries,
Shared norms, Past Successful Experiences,
Appropriate leadership, Group member
interdependence, Endowment heterogeneity,
Homogeneity of identities and interests, Low
levels of poverty
Overlap between user group residential
location and resource location, fairness in
allocation of benefits from common resources,
low levels of user demand, gradual change in
levels of demand
Rules are simple and easy to understand,
Locally devised access and management
rules, Ease in enforcement of rules, Graduated
sanctions, Availability of low cost adjudication,
Accountability of monitors to users

Group characteristics

Relationship between
resource system
and institutional
arrangements

Institutional
arrangements

Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration
of resources

Small size, well-defined boundaries, low levels
of mobility, Storage of Benefits, Predictability

Resource system
characteristics

Relationship between
resource system and
group

Constitutive elements or enabling conditions

Factors or core
subsystems

Ability to maintain rules of strict prohibition
on harvests

Local communities and inter-community
organizations have spaces within larger
frameworks of regulatory law to shape
specific local rules, Communities develop
capacity to negotiate conflicts with multiple
actors in turbulent settings

Low opportunity costs for conservation

Perception of conservation value of resource
by external actors, Ability to limit or prohibit
physical harvests, Possibility of benefits
from external actors for conservation
“Group” expanded to include collective
action by neighboring communities or
communities in the same region, Leaders
who understand possible benefits of multiscale governance

New elements required by CORENCHI case
study and others

Table 2: Proposed new elements and possible outcomes for common property theory

Strict conservation and
environmental services

Coproduction of rules.
Sophisticated negotiation and
conflict resolution skills

Strict conservation and
environmental services

Inter-community collective
action around individual
commons, creating a regional
commons, in a context of multiscale governance

Strict Conservation and
Environmental Services

New possible outcomes
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Technology: low cost exclusion technology,
time for adaptation to new technologies; low
levels of articulation with external markets,
gradual change in articulation with markets,
State: central governments should not
undermine local authority, supportive external
sanctioning institutions, appropriate levels of
external aid, nested levels of appropriation,
provision, enforcement, and governance

External environment

(First and Second Column modified from Ostrom 2009; Agrawal 2001).

Constitutive elements or enabling conditions

Factors or core
subsystems

Table 2 Continued

Capacity to intensely engage and negotiate
with external market and governmental
actors to realize benefits from conservation
or productive activities,
Ability to create new institutions and
organizations that facilitate interaction with
multiple actors at other scales.

New elements required by CORENCHI case
study and others
Turbulent, multi-scale
governance

New possible outcomes
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Expanding the number of variables and possible outcomes in common
property research does not make the analytical task any easier (Agrawal 2001).
The case study we have presented here adds some new elements that can constitute
common property theory:
•
•
•

•
•

that the resource has value for strict conservation and generation of
environmental service
that there are possibilities of realizing that value through extensive networks
that communities and inter-community organizations can establish rules
for strict conservation with no physical harvests within a framework for
coproduction of rules at multiple scales
that collective action can crucially take place at the inter-community level,
providing an efficient link with other levels and scales of governance
that visionary leaders can overcome locally confined solidarities, and that
conflicts are not adjudicated but negotiated in complex, turbulent settings at
multiple scales.

It also proposes new outcomes that can define success on the commons,
particularly strict conservation for environmental services and inter-community
collective action. Turbulent multi-scale governance based on communities can
be a general setting, an independent variable or an outcome depending on the
analysis carried out. We finally suggest that single case studies continue to be
relevant when they expand our understanding of the universe of variables and
outcomes that contribute to success on the multi-scale commons (Agrawal 2001;
George and Bennett 2005).
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